Wednesday, 13 March 2013

The question of correlation; Becoming sensitive to barbarians

Distancing himself from the concept of 'correlationism,' Levi Bryant muses on how his OOO is, in a sense, the most 'correlational' of philosophies:
Can I ever experience the world the way a mantis shrimp experiences the world?  Of course not.  However, through my knowledge of optics, electro-magnetic waves, its reactions to the environment about it, and so on, I can make all sorts of fallible inferences about what mantis shrimp have access to.

Sometimes I think my position is better described as “pan-correlationism” rather than as “realism”.  “Pan-correlationism” is the thesis that everything is an “observer” or that all things have access to the world in particular ways.  Put in Deleuzo-Spinozist terms, it would be the thesis that every entity is affected and affects other entities in its own way.  The way in which rocks have access to the world about them and act upon the world around them is different than how trees affect and are affected by the world, as well as from how corporations, governments, octopi, persons, and tiger sharks are affected by and affect the world.  Leibniz said that every monad is a point of view on the entire universe from a particular perspective.  Leibniz was saying that monads are observers.  Observing how observers observe is what really interests me.
This reminds me of a passage from Latour's eminently Leibnizian 'Irreductions':
The seagull, far from its name, far from its species, in its own world of air, sea, and favored fish; the fish far from its shoals, far from the gull and its beak, innocent in the icy water; the water that gathers together and shapes itself, mixed by the winds, knotted by the currents, heaving and breaking itself onto the beach ... The bird, far from its name, flies from the name that I give it, but continues to fly in treatises on zoology and the poems of St. John Perse. The gull is in its sky, irreducible to ours, but the language of the taxonomist is in the books, itself irreducible to any gull ever dreamed of, living or dead.
Oddly, perhaps, it also reminds me of a passage from Plato's 'Statesman.'  In this dialogue the Stranger is in conversation with Young Socrates; the topic of conversation is discovering the essence of the statesman; the method of discovering essences is that of dividing reality into classes, starting with the most general distinctions and working towards specifics.  After a while the Stranger invites Young Socrates to have a stab at it himself:
STRANGER: Very good, [Young] Socrates ...
And now, as you say, leaving the discussion of the
name,--can you see a way in which a person, by showing the art of
herding to be of two kinds, may cause that which is now sought amongst
twice the number of things, to be then sought amongst half that number?

YOUNG SOCRATES: I will try;--there appears to me to be one management of
men and another of beasts.

STRANGER: You have certainly divided them in a most straightforward and
manly style; but you have fallen into an error which hereafter I think
that we had better avoid.

YOUNG SOCRATES: What is the error?

STRANGER: I think that we had better not cut off a single small portion
which is not a species, from many larger portions; the part should be a
species. To separate off at once the subject of investigation, is a most
excellent plan, if only the separation be rightly made; and you were
under the impression that you were right, because you saw that you would
come to man; and this led you to hasten the steps. But you should not
chip off too small a piece, my friend; the safer way is to cut through
the middle; which is also the more likely way of finding classes.
Attention to this principle makes all the difference in a process of
enquiry.

YOUNG SOCRATES: What do you mean, Stranger?

STRANGER: I will endeavour to speak more plainly out of love to your
good parts, Socrates; and, although I cannot at present entirely explain
myself, I will try, as we proceed, to make my meaning a little clearer.

YOUNG SOCRATES: What was the error of which, as you say, we were guilty
in our recent division?

STRANGER: The error was just as if some one who wanted to divide the
human race, were to divide them after the fashion which prevails in this
part of the world; here they cut off the Hellenes as one species, and
all the other species of mankind, which are innumerable, and have
no ties or common language, they include under the single name of
'barbarians,' and because they have one name they are supposed to be of
one species also. Or suppose that in dividing numbers you were to
cut off ten thousand from all the rest, and make of it one species,
comprehending the rest under another separate name, you might say that
here too was a single class, because you had given it a single name.

...

STRANGER: Suppose now, O most courageous of dialecticians, that some
wise and understanding creature, such as a crane is reputed to be,
were, in imitation of you, to make a similar division, and set up cranes
against all other animals to their own special glorification, at the
same time jumbling together all the others, including man, under the
appellation of brutes,--here would be the sort of error which we must
try to avoid.

...
Plato's crane, Latour's seagull, Levi's mantis shrimp.  In different ways and for different reasons all these unassuming creatures represent the conclusion that the world of things is a plurality, not a duality.  There are real classes and real things but each of these things exist on their own and in their own right – any distinction that sets one kind of thing apart from all others is arbitrary and false so long as one fails to recognise that it is a distinction within a world of distinctions.

'Barbarians' are imagined by the same process that dualist philosophies are: by hiving off one tiny corner of reality and taking that fragment to be sui generis and exceptional, while everything left unmarked by that distinction is homogeneous, indistinguishable – a babbling mass of incoherence – barbarian.  Instead of performing the necessary labour of making distinction after distinction, whittling wholes into groups, sub-groups and sub-sub-groups, the dualist hives off one group alone and declares everything else to be of one kind in relation to it.  The real 'barbarism' is this demarcation itself.

It is interesting that Plato has the Stranger make this argument.  Xenophobia – irrational fear of strangers or foreigners – comes from the Greek xenos meaning "a guest, stranger, foreigner".  A 'barbarian' is thought to 'babble' because she speaks in a tongue that one cannot understand.  The xenophobe, in arrogance, takes an other's babbling to be 'what the other does' -- thinks that the other is a babbler, a fool; a blank, blinking vessel of incoherence.  And yet it is the xenophobe who is the fool – babbling is only manifest to the untrained ear of a monoglot.  To a polyglot the world is a rich, fully differentiated sea of differences – every language existing in and of itself, defined by its own characteristics, in a relationship of plurality to every other tongue.  The monoglot is unaware of any regime of expression or articulation besides his own – every other tongue is 'just noise.'  A monoglotic xenophobe takes the experience one step further and fearfully imagines the apparently undifferentiated mass to be of a single kind because they are undifferentiated to him.

There are two morals to this story:

First, take the correlate seriously.  The monoglotic xenophobe is a naive realist – he believes that because he experiences all the others of the world as an undifferentiated mass that they are; that there exist his people, on the one hand, and all the other barbarians of the world, on the other.  His demarcation, it turns out, is born out of ignorance rather than knowledge – by a correlational insensitivity; a perceptive poverty.

Second, being a pluralist rather than a dualist is a matter not of refusing or ignoring correlatedness but of working on becoming more correlationally sensitive – becoming more sensitive to the differences among things as they are representationally, correlationally manifest – by correlational sensitivity; by perspicacity.

If one looks out into the world and sees 'barbarians' – babbling, terrifyingly indistinguishable hoardes – this says nothing of those bodies and everything of one's own insensitivity towards difference.  The dualism of 'Hellene/barbarian' is an expression not of knowledge but of ignorance; not of sensitivity or intelligence but of the contrary.  The dualism of 'human/nature' is scarcely any different.

Plato's Stranger knew that.  He knew that differences must be worked out and distinguished carefully, gradually, without shortsighted shortcuts that would render any one group exceptional relative to a jumbled remainder that had no identity themselves – that A must be distinguished from B, C, D, E, etc. not from not-A.

Ignorance of correlate-dependence leads to dualism because it makes the perceiver insensitive to pluralities of difference.  It is only in recognising the profound existential significance of correlatedness (or whatever you want to call it) that real ontological pluralism is possible at all.  Far from ' the correlate' being the enemy, it is an indispensible component of any conceivable pluralist reality.

Moving from 'therefore' to 'and yet'; Overcoming the lust for victorious arguments

Philosophy is dominated too much by the conjunction 'therefore' – as if truth is merely deducing conclusions from premises.  Philosophy, I think, should be more concerned with the phrase 'and yet.'

 - We never encounter the world itself, only representations, models or simulations of the world; and yet we navigate the world expertly, reliably, reproducably – at once all at sea and yet sure footed.
 - Science is produced out of local, particular networks; and yet these knowledges are consistently applicable to previously unencountered phenomena – at once particular and yet 'universal'.
 - Every existing thing is unique, evolving, divergent, following a singular and individual trajectory; and yet there are structural homologies that occur between things of little common ancestry, highly similar patterns found in highly different beings – at once sui generis and yet uncannily similar.

Most contemporary philosophers myopically militate for either one clause or the other in a fist-pumping, ball-swinging dialectical ballet born from lusting after victorious arguments.  They always make the same mistake: beginning from an observed fact and deducing a truth from it by a series of 'therefores'.

 - 'We only encounter representations of reality not reality itself; therefore, all representation is self-referential and relates only to itself.'
 - 'Our techno-scientific apparatuses work; therefore, our knowledge is true since it would be a miracle if our machines worked otherwise.'

Et cetera.

These arguments – and many others – can be made with startlingly complex and rigourous reasoning.  And yet (!) they miss the point: the role of philosophy should be to investigate the paradox, the way in which both sides are both right and wrong – the 'and yet' of the situation.

Monday, 11 March 2013

Contrarianism and Oedipus; How to become a dominant French philosopher

In response to my last post an anonymous reader comments:
I get what you're saying about not wanting to cite whatever is "popular," but you have to remember that Latour is almost as cited as Deleuze or Foucault at this point! but remember also his discussion of citation practices in Science in Action...You have to think that every citation (and every omission) is strategic with Latour, especially digging up the work of Tarde, Souriau, etc with little more than a passing reference to the way they function similarly or differently in Deleuze's work. Frustrating, to say the least.
It's not just about not wanting to 'go with the crowd' for reasons of stubbornness or contrariness, I just think that these (stereotypically French) character-traits may play some part!  The urge to be contrary is something I can relate to, which is why I like this explanation but I don't believe at all that it is a sufficient one.

Choosing not to cite persons who are presently perceived to be over-cited or over-hyped is clearly strategic in and of itself (this goes for Foucault too).  It's about setting yourself apart – Foucault wanted to set himself apart from the Marxists, Latour from the poststructuralists.  It's a bit Oedipal, really – every generation wants to 'violently' distinguish itself from the previous one, regardless of how much intellectual debt the succeeding generation really owes.  Latour wanted to set himself apart from the generation of Deleuze, Foucault, Derrida, etc. that had come just before him, just like they wanted to set themselves apart from the stucturalisms of Levi-Strauss, Saussure, Jakobsen, Althusser, etc.  However, this demarcation isn't purely narcissistic; there are some very significant ways in which Latour's thought (and that of Michel Callon, etc.) departs from the poststructuralists (and they from the structuralists); it just isn't quite the quantum leap that he would have us believe.

I share much of your frustration with Latour's writing practices.  He generally has to be read as a philosophical polemicist rather than a scholarly essayist.  This is perhaps tempered a little in papers that he's co-authored but even then you can still detect his prose-style, which is intrinsically performative.  It's interesting that he's chosen 'diplomacy' as a concept relatively late in his career.  His writing has always been 'diplomatic' insofar as it's at least as much to do with the implicit 'signalling' and the subtle games of rhetoric and alliance-building (and perhaps enemy-making) as it is to do with the actual content.

This article makes for interesting reading:
http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/soc/faculty/lamont/Derrida.pdf
It's a highly formal, partially quantitative study of, as the title puts it, "How to Become a Dominant French Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida".  Many of the tricks and tropes Latour employs are found in Derrida too, such as being deliberately vague so as to appeal to the largest possible audience, etc.  The article is a little reductive but a little reduction can yield insights; it definitely illustrates the kind of 'political economy' particular to French intellectualism, especially when it comes to the propagation of such ideas in North America (something that Latour has been almost as successful as the likes of Derrida at achieving).

One thing about writing polemically, as Latour does, is that you've always got to expect polemic in return.  It's important not to take a polemicist too seriously or to be shy about submitting their claims to critique – to give them a taste of their own medicine, in other words (and despite his banging on about the flaws of critique he does do a lot of it).  Being the agonistic, argumentative, 'diplomatic' type that Latour is I suppose he expects people to call him out on his elisions and silences, to draw the links and point out the associations that he leaves implicit.  That can seem arrogant – expecting others to do the legwork – and can be frustrating since it begs so many questions but that's the rhetorical style that seems to work within the political economy of 'being a dominant French philosopher.'  He's certainly not the first to do it and I’m sure he won’t be the last.