Friday, 18 October 2013

Thinking about an alter-humanism internal to ANT; Policing translation in the borderlands

Nicholas replies to my last comment on his blog; an excerpt:
...Like the hard-won efforts to generate political agency, ours was a hard-won battle to generate technological agency but with a balance. Jan and I have always written that ANT has been used in so many and so many contradictory ways that it almost defies simple summary and has a much more malleable character these days, as it is collided with new theories born in disciplines with different traditions and orienting assumptions. 
So, a materialist answer that still provides something of political agency: I wonder what a discussion would look like if it were started like this: “what should we do with bodies when we de-center humans?” 
I think that in Jan and I’s chapter for that new book, we are walking as far away as we can from humanist theories of international relations precisely waiting for the moment for other to say “STOP, you’re too close to the edge!” Not because we have “materialist-blinders” on, but because I think the ultimate answer to your question will not have almost anything to do with theories or findings, and instead it will be a professional or (dare I say, but surely I do mean it) aesthetic decisions about what theories and models we will invite to populate our home disciplines. This will be something of a traditional “gate keeping” practice that nearly any discipline must encounter. Given the “migratory” (or predatory, depending on perspective) uses of ANT … perhaps its time for a few boundary policemen in IR to ask the hard question: now that they are in the gates, do we let them say and settle here?
I tend to cross post my longer comments on other blogs here. That much typing must deserve a post of its own! So here it is.

I think that kind of dialectical, agonistic discursive approach is a very valid one.  Take your line of argument as far as you can until someone stops you or until it breaks down!  It recognises that thought is a dialogical process and one where (polite) conflict can be productive.

I think that a kind of neo- or alter-humanism is possible from within ANT.  It simply has to take the form of: the more mediations, the more attachments the better (that's the ANT way).  What are the associations and assemblages that make us human?  Can we intensify them to make us even more human (note, not post-human but more human)?  The problem with classic humanism is the location of agency in the human body as if human beings were substances with essential properties.  It's an occult theory that always requires a 'context' to be appended to the individual body as if these things were somehow of different orders of reality.  Instant dualism, just add water.  The worst part of this bodily ontology is that we are locked in to our bodies, as if they are all we are, as if being born naked means we have to live naked.  If, on the contrary, humanity is the product of a broader network then that network can be extended.

I'm thinking of an essay of Latour's on 'qualculation' (what a horrible word!) where he says that e.g. in a supermarket the way that prices are laid out per unit and per weight, etc. turn the shopper into a calculating subject; the shopper 'downloads' that capacity through the network.  Likewise in extended cognition terms we can think of the expansion of calculative capacities that comes even from a simple abacus, for example.

What are the attachments that constitute human political subjectivity and how can they be extended, intensified?  I think part of answering that question might mean taking another look the word 'agency' itself.  If it really is as essential as the humanists say (and aren't we supposed to be ethnomethodologists and diplomats who 'respect our informants'?) then perhaps that's something that needs to be sacrificed, given up to the human inasmuch as it is taken to refer to those attachments that achieve a particular kind of agency, a particular kind of subjectivity instead of standing for all kinds of causal efficacy in general.  It is just a bit of terminology, after all, it is a replaceable part.  It's the spark plug of ANT - essential and yet replaceable.

As for the need for boundary policing, yes I think so.  I'd go so far as to say that ANT requires that kind of opposition.  After all, what produces translation?  A trial.  And if no one opposes ANT's adventurism with any force then there are no real trials and no translation of any significance.  In that sense ANT is an intrinsically agonistic, dialectical, dialogical form of discourse.  It needs to be told no.

I'm also thinking this issue through Latour's modes book that I'm about 2/3 of the way through.  That puts a whole other spin on things as it makes NET one mode among many (albeit a pivotal one).  The modes are pretty transformational for Latour's ANT but he still maintains the ontological policy of 'agency for all' so there's still a debate to be had on that, very much so.  Particularly as the politics mode is quite weak, I think (based on my reading so far at least).  Certainly weaker than some of the others.

From physiká to metaphysiká; Grand theories as 'portals'

In the comments to my last post dmf writes:
... personally I don't feel the need for a "meta" to physics and I think this ties in with our earlier discussion of Latour leaving the field/lab behind to take a perch for a more God's-eye view.
It's late and I'm not sure that I can think straight but this prompts some words to emerge from my brain, run through my nervous system and into my tippy-tappy, keyboard bothering fingers.  Here they are:

I don't think there's anything to be feared in shifting from physiká to metaphysiká.  If any discourse claims to be a god's eye view of reality it's surely modern physics!  A metaphysics that tries to explain things away or to denigrate the non-meta is a bad metaphysics but one that acknowledges the metaphysical presuppositions implicit in our physical experiences, gives them a vocabulary and thus makes them thinkable is alright in my book.  As long as it does something worthwhile it is worthwhile.  That it is intrinsically speculative is neither here nor there.

I think that we need to do away with the notion that metaphysics is the 'highest' form of knowledge.  In a way it's the lowest.  Below even common sense.  It's an expression not of knowledge but of ignorance; it's a way of muddling through despite our almost complete ignorance of that of which we speak.  It can be exciting but it's nothing to be exalted.

The same is broadly true of e.g. grand, macroscopic social and political theories.  These are usually accorded the grandest honours and greatest respect.  The more a theory is said to 'explain,' the wider the window it gazes from, the higher the vantage point it looks down from the more wonderful it is said to be.  This is nonsense.  The higher you rise up in your observation balloon the further you see, yes, but the worse you see it.  Reach increases as resolution declines.

The best that can be said of grand theories (and this is an important virtue, I'm not damning by faint praise) is that they are often extremely well connected.  Like a good map, you can use a grand theory to travel widely and securely with very little terra incognita roughing up your smooth ride.  A good map is a 'portal' that connects intimately to everywhere it represents but without even beginning to 'sum up,' much less 'explain away,' anything (or even trying).

If every pixel of a digital bitmap is a trajectory connected to a locality then you can either focus in closely on one thing and connect to it very intensively or step back and capture many things but be much less connected to any one of them.  That's a stretched analogy but hopefully it makes sense.  Grand theories as portals are valuable.  The trouble comes when we take grandiosity to suggest proximity to the real.  If anything the opposite is true, although a bad map connects to nowhere.

Thursday, 17 October 2013

The risk of 'de-centering humans'; Reflections on LSE last year

Nicholas at Installing (Social) Order has a nice post updating the blogosphere on their latest work, particularly on 'decentering humans' in International Relations.  I'm glad to see that these issues are still burning away and that the IR/ANT collective is still hanging together!

With regard to the project in general, one question that must ultimately be asked, I think, is: when we have traced all the networks that form the human how do we avoid humans being dissolved into those networks?  How do we avoid shifting from anthropocentrism to an un-self-critical network-centrism?  How do we avoid the political complacency that can potentially come from thoroughgoing relationality?  Are there no unintended consequences of ANT's creeping colonisation of more and more intellectual territory?  I think that there are.

This is something that came up at the Millennium conference last year, as I'm sure you remember!  There was a clear divide at that event between ANT-types and others, most particularly from the critical realist camp, for whom human reflexivity as the basis of political agency is indispensable.  It was argued that the appropriation of 'agency' as a substitute for 'causality' undoes all the hard won victories of emancipatory politics (and its accompanying critical theory) in the 20th century.

As something of an ANT-phile I was quite challenged by this idea.  David Chandler in particular helped me to see the point.  I came to realise that it isn't just a blustery, reactionary reiteration of substantialism or modernist humanism (although it sometimes goes that way too!).  When ANT was working just on science and technology it was easy to downplay and de-exceptionalise the agency of the human - scientists and technicians had been granted far too much agency, far too much centredness and self-control and therefore depriving them of that was methodologically and politically unproblematic.  No one was ever going to lapse into thinking that these people really lacked agency or were cultural dopes; the goal was to shift these human agents back into their networks and ANT did that brilliantly.

When we shift forward 25 years and look at the situation where, now, rightly or wrongly, ANT is a sociological metalanguage that is informing all kinds of theorisation we have to tread much more carefully.  The political agency of human beings in general is in no way as assured as that of scientists and technicians.  We simply can't take human agency for granted in all walks of life (or in all modes of existence, perhaps).  Remember that ANT ethnographers were always (and they were always aware of this) studying up.  That is, they were studying persons with more power, money and prestige than they themselves enjoyed.  Studying down, studying persons who are downtrodden, disenfranchised, held by dominant discourses to be feckless and incapable of rational self-determination - these people need to be treated with greater care.

To systematically remove all the classic humanist means by which their agency can be defended without careful consideration of consequences is, frankly, irresponsible.

That isn't to say that ANT-type work has no place within broader social or political theory.  Far from it.  I am still an ANT-phile!  All I mean to say is that irreducing the human must not, ultimately, dissolve the human.  The ontological status of human political agency is too fragile to be thrown around so cavalierly.  That doesn't mean that we must stop walking in the direction that we have been but, as Latour would put it, we may need to slow down.  It isn't that ANT cannot be translated into all these different areas but we need to recognise and deal with the ever larger degree of transformation that is required to properly extend these networks the further they stray from their origins.  Part of that, I think, means that we have to find a way of saying: the more mediations, the more human.  More humanity, not less.  A new humanism.

That's the major realisation that I got from the LSE event last year (having had a year to reflect on it!).

Monday, 14 October 2013

Modes: abstract/concrete

This is at risk of becoming an extremely prolific blogging day by my very low standards.  Terence writes more; this is the first sentence:
Traditions are polarised by Latour into abstract modes and concrete domains.
How abstract are the modes?  Or, in what way are they abstract?  They are produced qua philosophical objects by a process of abstraction, for sure.  They are essences abstracted from a more complex and chaotic milieux.  But they are not abstract like, say, Whitehead's eternal objects.  If Latour is right then the modes are instantiated in every event of their kind.  If they cease to be instantiated then they must surely disappear from existence.  They have to spread like viruses; to stop spreading is to go extinct.  If they are real then they cannot exist in any 'elsewhere' like eternal objects.  That sounds an awful lot like concreteness to me.

Consulting my trusty etymology dictionary I find that the root of abstract is the Latin abstractus meaning "drawn away."  In this sense the modes are the opposite to 'abstract' - they draw towards, draw together.  The modes themselves seem to be, in principle, utterly concrete; the drawing away comes when we divert them from their trajectories to be poked and prodded by our conceptual interrogations.  They are concrete beings that, like any being, can be abstracted by reference.  We shouldn't mistake their abstracted state for what they are (if we accept that the referential chains are valid).

Anyway, that's enough thinking for one day.

Niall Ferguson's incessant whinging

Niall Ferguson continues his crusade to whinge and cry foul at every left-of-far-right blogger on the Internet.  This time he's summarily swatted away by the Politics Editor of Business Inside, no less.
One final note. In the process of criticizing me, Ferguson writes: "If you are defending someone against a charge of incivility..." I'm going to stop him right there. I'm not defending anybody against a charge of incivility. Paul Krugman is often quite uncivil. I am sometimes uncivil too, for example in this blog post. 
The reason Ferguson wants to talk about civility is that he can't talk about not being full of crap. Ferguson trades on his academic credentials to write popular articles that contain misleading and false claims. His writing causes readers to come away with a worse understanding of the economy than they entered with. He is changing the world for the worse. 
My contention is not that we haven't been uncivil to Ferguson. We definitely have. My contention is that he deserves it.
Well, that's my schadenfreude fix for the day.

Yet more on ontological conservatism and the confluence of modes

Terence comments on Levi's comments on my comments on Latour's modes.  (How's that for a referential chain?)

On the 'prohibition of category mistakes arising from illegitimate crossings,' it is not all crossings that are said to be 'bad.'  Far from it - modes are co-dependent.  What use is REF without REP?  Were there nothing of the latter there'd be nothing to 'bring back.'  Likewise, TEC cannot function without beings of REP to hybridise.  In the habit chapter he gives the example that if a microphone goes out during a pastor's sermon then it takes an engineer to fix it and that's a REL/TEC crossing.  Every mode such as REL, LAW, POL, etc. is related to a specific form of HAB and various METs and NETs - these uber-modes.  The prohibition is on crossings that do violence to the modes and seek to erase one or the other of them.  So, there's clearly a conservatism or conservationism inherent in that but it's not crossings that are illegitimate per se, only certain forms of crossing that try to state one mode in terms of another, thereby erasing the former (at least that's my understanding).

That said, he's altering his argument subtly as the book progresses.  In the habit chapter he's now able to say that DC isn't all bad.  It's now the result of well ordered processes; it's an appearance and appearance has its own mode of existence, HAB (a mode itself pluralised by the fact that every other mode instantiates it differently).  Even the appearance of being 'critical' early on in the book vis-a-vis the 'evil genius' of DC was, in fact, just another mode to be asserted positively.  An addition to the pluriverse, not a subtraction from it.

What is this kind of ontological optimism lacking?  It doesn't prevent us from questioning or interrogating modes - indeed, the whole endeavour seeks to lay them bare, to de-habituate them and open them to appreciation (i.e. appreciation meaning an assessment of value).  It isn't 'uncritical' in that sense; it is de-habituating.  It doesn't stop us proposing new modes that transform the other modes by their entry into the ecosystem (indeed, this is highly encouraged).  It doesn't stop us from combining modes in new ways, provided that we do not attempt to define one mode in terms of another.  It doesn't necessarily mean that e.g. an ethnographer working with a church group must be essentially preoccupied with REL.  That group is a confluence of all kinds of modes and cannot even begin to be understood mono-modally.  Fieldwork is essentially polymodal, that much is clear.  Nor does it stop us from extending e.g. the REL mode to situations that are not conventionally 'religious.'  Indeed, as I mentioned before that mode is defined so abstractly that it could apply to almost anything.

However, this ontological optimism does tend to encourage us to 'keep our distance,' to let others just get on with their modal adventures unperturbed; to live and let live, so to speak.  And this brings me back to what I said about chapter 1 with Latour exoticising the other in order to construct it as that which must be absolutely respected - 'respected' to the point where it seems unclear as to how we could even engage with it (a common problem, in fairness).  An anthropology of almost any church group (to rejoin that example) would surely demonstrate that most Believers tend at least as much towards a kind of confluence of REF and DC overlaid with a hazy mysticism of HAB, speckled with flecks of MET, as they are to the translations described by REL.  That Jesus really was the son of God, that there are indisputable moral certainties and that the Bible 'proves' this in a very real and referential sense (pointing to the book to make a point, quoting chapter and verse to prove a point, etc., everything points towards reference!) is fundamental to these forms of life.

The assertion that these are really just crossings (however legitimate) and that REL is the true essence of religion is not a merely descriptive, empirical assertion - it is a proposition, a declaration of value, an appreciation of value.  It is an assertion that the proper form of religion is concentrated around the REL mode with crossings across that mode only serving its practical, institutional needs.  It is a value judgement.  And this is where Latour must depart (and if he does not do so then be deported!) from his self-styled evidentialist empiricism and reveals his true moral-political-philosophical colours.

These are not just neutral descriptions of modes as they really are but the distillation and rearticulation of the values of the Moderns - a kind of saving of the Moderns, an identification of what is valuable in their metaphysics, a flushing out of the poison and a reconstitution of the valuable materials as a carefully designed, rigorously controlled 'menu of values.'  Like a kind of tapas menu (if you permit me the analogy) where some items are necessary (the bread and butter modes) and you're encouraged to try everything but some items are optional.  All items, however, have been carefully crafted from many materials - an appropriately heterogeneous network.  It is a gourmet restaurant, the cuisine is often stunning in its subtly and ingenuity but it can hardly pass its wares off as raw - nor would it want to.  Everything is highly refined and, indeed, this is what makes the whole endeavour valuable; that is the chef's skill.  No mediations, no value.  Essential Latourism.

Long story short, the value menu is propositional, not simply descriptive.  It may be based upon experience both as a concept and in terms of some fieldwork but that doesn't change the fact that its menu items are highly philosophically refined.  Latour's rhetoric (for we really must distinguish it from the substance of his argument, there's no other way to read him) often implies an earthy, concrete empiricism-qua-evidentialism that is promised but never really delivered.  The empiricism-qua-trajectories-of-experience is perfectly valid - he channels some experiences and not others.  No problem there.  But he should be more direct in his representation of his endeavours.  His skill is great but he sometimes tries to pass it off as magic.  This must not be permitted.  A habit, an appearance of the worst sort.

REL isn't 'how religion works' (though I can accept that it may be part of how religion works), it's the part of religion that is asserted to be most valuable, the most appreciated.  A kind of mereological judgement (and therefore critique since judgement connotes critique) - looking into the assemblage, picking out the most valuable part according to your own predispositions and making this the essence of the thing, whether it is functionally essential or not (that is an open question - a lab without REF is surely unthinkable - it'd be a total failure - but the same may not be true of religious groups and REL).

By doing this across a range of domains one ends up with a system of essential values that can be debated with others and their interpretations of what's essential and what's not.  That's the way around the impasse of the rhetoric of description/empiricism vs. the reality of proposition/judgement.  Take them for what they are and then they can be properly debated; indeed, this is the condition of possibility for diplomacy.

The essences are not idealisations.  REL is not the idealisation of religious practice, it is one part of it - a part raised up and honoured by its identification.  The mereological judgement extracts and abstracts this one component and raises it to the level of essence.  Not because that's necessarily how things work but because that's how things work best - or so it is claimed.

If we take this approach to the modes then things open up and are pluralised again.  If we ignore the continual, nagging suggestion that these modes have been rigorously derived from experience of the way things are and simply accept that they are derived from particular, narrow portions of experience that have been abstracted, translated and submitted for debate and scrutiny then, personally, I find little more to object to on this issue as long as we're also able to say that e.g. REL isn't confined to religious practice but is simply typified by it; that religion is the archetypical instantiation of it but does not 'own' it.

If we can assume all of that (a double dislocation) then I don't see what is to stop someone (a) detaching REL from religious practice in observing it in other kinds of situations and (b) insisting that REF is the appropriate mode for exploring fundamental questions of cause and reason, that the piousness of REL is sometimes an appropriate form of translation but it's nothing to base a life around and that religious practice is for the most part a crossing of FIC/HAB with some thoroughly misunderstood MET thrown in for good measure all wrapped up with an often dangerous ribbon of POL and LAW.  That doesn't define any mode in terms of any other; its a perfectly legitimate diplomatic argument.  It doesn't deny the reality of REL, it simply recognises that religious practice is neither determined by that mode nor is that mode exhausted by religious practice.

Apologies to anyone who managed to read all of that.  I'm still working this out as I'm writing it!  There must be a shorter way of making the point but that's all I've got for now.

More on ontological conservatism

Terence replies to my previous comments on Latour's ontological conservatism.  He uses the phrase “duty of non-infringement” to describe the way Latour defends his modes – that’s a good way of putting it. I think a lot of it comes down to how we interpret that. On the one hand Latour is very clear that he wants to grant ‘dignity’ to each mode, that each mode is valid and good in its own way, etc. However, this is stated and insinuated rather than actually argued. His intention is clear but he doesn’t go so far as to say why the modes must be conserved at all cost – why no creative destruction? If they are historical then surely that is inevitable, given a long enough timeframe. Why hold back the tide as a matter of necessity?

Or is it necessary?  It seems like that from the way his argument proceeds but I do wonder.  In its precise technical definition I don’t see what the REL mode even does to save religion, really. It’s narrated in such a way that it’s clearly meant to defend religion from its detractors but it’s a funny sort of defence. REL is defined so abstractly that it could apply to completely non-religious situations – ‘I adhered religiously to my instructions - I agonised over them out of respect to their originator.' And if it can be detached from religious situations then religion is merely an archetype of the mode, nothing intrinsic to the mode itself (perhaps this is true of all the modes; they are named by their archetypes rather than their essences).

Sunday, 13 October 2013

Modes, Pure Philosophy and Latour's Will-to-conserve

Terence Blake has a couple of posts criticising Latour's modes and his philosophical strategies.  The second post begins:
Latour bifurcates our traditions into the heterogeneous networks of domains (concrete traditions) and the homogeneous felicity conditions of modes (abstract traditions) and their values. Having spent a lot of time explaining to us how science, contrary to its image as an abstract tradition, is in fact a concrete impure assemblage of actors and trajectories, Latour is now explaining how nevertheless one can abstract out a pure value of objectivity that is served by this composite rhizomic domain.
The further I'm getting through the book the more I'm liking it, however I am also more convinced of one of my initial impressions: that this is a work of pure philosophy.  It is 'empiricist' only in the most abstract, philosophical sense (despite what Latour insinuates).  Yes, Latour has done case studies on science, law, technology and so on, and to some extent aime is a synthesis of all is work to date.  But he's written no case studies on politics, for example (Politics of Nature is another work of pure philosophy).  The majority of the modes has no anthropological connections whatsoever - at least not yet.

Not that there's anything wrong with that as such but it is as though admitting doing pure philosophy isn't good enough for him and so it has to have these empiricist motifs tagged on here and there, clogging up the flow of concepts in order to make it all seem more real and grounded.

There is, of course, a very real sense in which his work is empiricist - that is, 'radical empiricist'.  The whole endeavour is built on the foundation of James' flows of experience but this is a purely philosophical empiricism; ironically, it doesn't seem to flow all that directly from or into fieldwork.

However, as for this 'bifurcation between networks and modes' it's quite a weak bifurcation inasmuch as, I believe he states early on, every concrete situation is an event of both NET and one PRE or other.  The limitless heterogeneity of NET is always combined with the particular essence of a mode.  REF is not equal to science; science both exceeds it and REF exceeds science.  So, there's still plenty of room for the heterogeneity and messiness of real practices.

I agree that his way of setting out the modes is conservative.  However, every mode inserted into the schema will transform the whole assemblage.  Perhaps it isn't the will to conserve and protect that is the problem but the absence of other modes that would, if recognised, transform the whole?  That's my working hypothesis, I'm still working out what those modes might be.

Saturday, 12 October 2013

Letts, Question Time, Ideology, The Establishment

Watching Question Time last week was a fascinating experience.  The audience spontaneously burst out laughing - not just some sarcastic sniggers, proper belly laughs - when Quentin Letts insisted that the Daily Mail (the paper for which he is a columnist) was an 'anti-establishment' paper.  He was visibly shaken by that, almost like he couldn't get his head around it.

I think in their own little mental universe the country really is run by Beeb socialists and pinko trade unionists (whereas in reality these are a dying breed, if they ever existed at all).

It's probably true that Rupert Murdoch, for example, was an outsider to the establishment when he started out (see this brilliant work from Adam Curtis) but he's certainly not now.  Times change, often for the worse!  But the DM were never in that position at any point in history, as far as I can see.

I'm not a Marxist but when the ol' beardie weirdie is right he's right: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force."

The DM may not represent the 'centre ground' of establishment ideology but they do represent its worst excesses, its dregs, its most toxic sludge.  They are its gutter.  Gutter press in the truest sense.

Thursday, 10 October 2013

Latour, Realism, Sunsets and the Mode of Realpolitik

Levi is back - and angry.  I actually quite like him when he's angry.
there are ... places where anti-realism is absolutely correct, true, and appropriate. If, by “real”, we mean “substantially existing”, not everything is “real”. The beauty of sunsets? No, only beings with certain nervous systems experience that. The essences of the Egyptian people? Nope, doesn’t exist.
Having been reading Latour's modes book a lot recently I can only read this in modal terms.  For Levi it seems that there are only two modes, still.  There's the sunset and the sun; the subjective and the objective; the unreal and the real.  Only two types of existence, two ways of persisting.  All further distinctions must seemingly be made within those master categories.  His ontology is pluralist inasmuch as it consists of a vast plurality of things but it's dualist in terms of its modes of existence.

Therefore, in Latour's terms, Levi is firmly within the 'modern parenthesis' - post-Locke, pre-James.  Of course, I'm sure he'd criticise Latour's rejection of substances, etc. but Latour's pluralism poses some challenges.  E.g. are all 'subjective' phenomena really of one mode?  Is 'subjective' really such a secure storehouse for such diverse phenomena as sense experience, dreams, fear, ratiocination, etc?  Can all further distinctions safely be made within those two categories?

Perhaps the antagonism between realism and anti-realism isn't the result of them not being 'put in their place' but the result of them being false categories to begin with.

If there's a trauma over this within academic circles I think it comes from the way that skepticism has been turned into a weapon of the powerful - the US's latent anti-intellectualism honed into a fearsome weapon of ideological war.  Few are even capable of admitting that this is a problem for the project of critique, deconstruction, constructivism, etc.  If there's an 'X step' program for overcoming skepticism then surely admitting you have a problem must be step 1.

As for issues such as the shutdown and climate change, Latour's POL mode is telling.  In politics you either succeed in building your alliances or you fail.  There are no consolation prizes for having the best reference chains or being the most morally sensitive.  (These things only matter insofar as they get you allies - no more, no less.)  Although he narrates it largely in the language of pragmatist liberal democratic theory it's really a realpolitik mode.

'So, you have secure, near-certain scientific knowledge?  Good for you.  What about your alliances?  They are weak?  Then you fail.  And don't say 'but I'm right!' - you are, but that is irrelevant.'

Tuesday, 1 October 2013

Monbiot on Boyd; The Tory government's censure of science

In the Guardian today George Monbiot does his best to eviscerate an article by Professor Ian Boyd, chief scientific adviser at the UK's Department for Environment:
Boyd's doctrine is a neat distillation of government policy in Britain, Canada and Australia. These governments have suppressed or misrepresented inconvenient findings on climate change, pollution, pesticides, fisheries and wildlife. They have shut down programmes that produce unwelcome findings and sought to muzzle scientists. This is a modern version of Soviet Lysenkoism: crushing academic dissent on behalf of bad science and corporate power.
Having read the article in question it perhaps isn't quite as dastardly as it's been portrayed, however I do strongly disagree with it and I do despair that someone like Boyd could represent the voice of science in this country, co-opted as he clearly is by one side of the relationship that he is supposed to mediate.

Some of what he said is valid.  E.g. in his conclusion he writes:
Policy-making is a messy, sometimes chaotic, process because it needs to include social, electoral, ethical, cultural, practical, legal and economic considerations in addition to scientific evidence.
Undoubtedly he is right.  And if there are any scientists who don't accept this democratic (as opposed to technocratic) political reality then they are in the wrong.  However, in the next and final paragraph Boyd goes on to say:
The scientific community needs to build a strong sense about how it fits in to this complex mixture to ensure that its contribution to future decisions can be maximised. This means sticking to the evidence and describing clearly what it does and does not say; expressing the balance of risk associated with one or other policy option and avoiding suggesting that policies are either right or wrong; and being willing to make the voice of science heard by engaging with the mechanisms already available through science advisory committees, by working with embedded advisers (such as myself), and by being the voice of reason, rather than dissent, in the public arena.
In other words: The system works, don't you dare go outside of it.  Know your place.  Scientists should speak only when spoken to.

Just because technocracy cannot be substituted for democracy doesn't mean that scientists should just sit in their proscribed little boxes and do as they're told (what a technocratic, undemocratic, apolitical notion that is in its own way!).  They have every right to shout as loud as they wish.  Indeed, that is their duty.  It is the politician's burden to have to occasionally ignore them and to take the flak when they do - just as they do with every other part of the demos.  It is the scientist's role to argue their point with as much force and power as they can muster and the politician's role to adjudicate between that constituency and others.

Asking the scientist to pipe down because the politician has a headache isn't good enough.  If you can't stand the heat...

Politics is agonistic - it inevitably involves conflict and disagreement.  No conflict, no politics.  Scientists can't get their way all the time, nor should they.  However, this doesn't mean that they should shut up and get back in their labs.  You can't please all the people all the time but that mustn't stop the people (including scientists) having their say.  It doesn't make them any less scientists, any less objective, any less competent.  If some say argue the contrary then that is their fault, not that of the scientists.

There's much else wrong with Boyd's article too.  His reading of the TB/badger issue is mealy mouthed and misleading.  He fixates on 'uncertainty,' suggesting that if the science is uncertain (as it almost always is) then scientists cannot legitimately make factual claims.  He suggests that scientists must simply provide politicians with 'the facts' and then shut up - as if it were that simple.

Worst of all, he takes the breakdown of that idealised, impossible relationship to be the fault of the scientists alone, placing all of the blame and the burden for reform on the scientists.

Boyd seems to yearn for science/politics to be a nice, polite, agreeable conversation - perhaps over a cup of tea - where scientists are courteous and dutiful and say 'thank you, sir' when they've been told 'no.'

In thrall to power.

Tuesday, 10 September 2013

Call for papers on 'Politics and the Later Latour'

This August sees the publication of the English translation of Bruno Latour’s ‘An Inquiry
into Modes of Existence’ (AIME), marking both a landmark in the long-collaborative AIME
project and a significant development in Latour’s thought. This issue of Global Discourse
will examine the political significance of Latour’s later work, which has seen important
developments that expand and move beyond Actor-Network-Theory. In particular, the issue
will explore Latour’s focus on modes of existence, the call for compositionism and the move
from modernising to ecologising.
More here.

It's interesting that this call for papers seems to reproduce Harman's own chronology of Latour's work that demarcates it into the 'early' ANT era and the 'late' modes era (he uses this demarcation in his Prince of Modes book). This chronology is one of the things that allows Harman to, I think, quite drastically misread Latour and turn his ANT into a general metaphysics.

Latour says that it is the 'modes' that is the metaphysics and that ANT is and always has been just a sociological subcomponent of that (even though this wasn't clear until recently).  Because Harman makes a whole metaphysics out of ANT alone - and because he insists that this is what Latour himself is saying rather than just admitting that it is his own peculiar version of Latour's words - he has to insist that they are different projects entirely and are marked by a definite temporal demarcation.

The translation begins to stand in for the translated!  There is something very Latourian about that, I must admit.

Friday, 30 August 2013

Syria, Politician's Logic

We must do something; this is something; therefore we must do it.


Nothing I've read so far proves to me that inaction will have worse consequences than action.  The contrary may even be true.

No matter how horrific the Syrian regime's crimes the bombs will fall as they may - no amount of moral outrage will make them any more accurate or their consequences any less unpredictable.

Some seem impervious to this reasoning.  They argue that the regime's crimes are horrific, therefore the West must act.  They fail to see the giant, gaping gap in the middle of that sentence - what can be done?

Saturday, 24 August 2013

UKIP, Nigel Farage, populist politics

This interview with Nigel Farage was a slightly peculiar read.  It's hardly that surprising that a populist politician is, in person, affable and good company - that's really his purpose in life.

He's often praised for his 'refreshing honesty' but I think 'honesty' is the wrong word entirely.  He's refreshingly candid, sure.  He certainly provides a stark contrast to other politician's default mode of robotic soundbite-spewing.  As an outsider who shows just how homogeneous and monotonous the rest of our politicians have become he has value.

However, no amount of blokey affability should distract from the intellectual and moral bankruptcy of his politics.  He's a Little Englander through and through and the fact that there are a lot of those about doesn't make it any better.

Nature as 'beyond the human'

The concept of nature as 'what is non-human' or 'beyond human influence' no longer makes any sense. It's a remnant of theology. If you believe humans to have perishable bodies but immortal souls then we are part natural, part supernatural. If you believe that our consciousness, our thought, our reason, our morality, etc. are part of our souls then it makes sense to separate them from 'nature.' If we're made in god's image then it makes perfect sense to see the rest of existence as apart from (and perhaps subservient to) us.

Of course, few actually believe in such nonsense these days (or few would admit to doing so) but our concept of nature still derives from just such a separation.

We can't 'intervene' in nature - we're already part of it. Our influence on the climate is not any more existentially profound than an abnormally large bloom of algae or something. Of course, unlike algae, we have an understanding and awareness of what we are doing but that capacity for consciousness is itself internal to nature - one of its more remarkable products.

Human beings are fully natural beings, just like any other. Given modern understandings of existence 'nature' can only be a synonym for 'reality' or 'the universe.' In other words, it covers everything and as such has no real meaning. As something 'other than the human' it is nonsensical.

Some comments on scientific consensus, climate cynics, peer review

Science is majoritarian. There is no 'vote' as such but how else can controversies be decided? By magic? They're decided, temporarily, when most scientists agree on them - until something else happens to change the consensus.

The trick is that minority views, if they are true, must find a way to become the majority view by providing convincing evidence and argument. This never happens all at once or without struggle but a strong enough case will win out in the end.

The fact that climate sceptics/cynics are a minority doesn't mean that they're wrong. The fact that they continue to be a minority and have no actually convincing evidence or arguments - that means that they're wrong.

It's most frustrating people say 'peer reviewed' as if it meant 'scientifically certified.'  'Peer review' in a general sense doesn't end at publication. Scientists continually review, reproduce,reinforce and criticise other scientist's work. That's where scientific objectivity comes from.

The Peer Review stage of publication is only the first step. It only guarantees that a paper is worthy of wider attention, debate and scrutiny, not that it's flawless and unassailable.

'Peer review' in a general sense can go on for years, decades, centuries even. When a previously accepted idea is overturned that is because peers have reviewed it and convinced themselves through experimentation and argument that another set of observations or another interpretation of the facts is superior.

David Miranda, apologism, double standards

Cases like the David Miranda detention really bring the political worms out of the woodwork.  There's always a reserve army of right-wingers ready and willing to defend the indefensible.

It's annoying that Louise Mensch is still considered a legitimate voice in British politics but she's an excellent weathervane for the younger, more PR savvy right-wingers in the world.   Like their elders, their capacity for entirely unabashed hypocrisy is amazing.

They're the kind of people who think that the government can't be trusted to run schools and hospitals but can be trusted to have unlimited powers of detention, powers to gag the press, to wage illegal wars and to abduct, torture and assassinate people willy-nilly. That stuff's all fine but trust them to collect and spend taxes on public services - hang on now!!! That's tyranny!!!!

Ed Miliband and 'weakness'; David Cameron and reptilian smarminess

All corners of the media have been beating the 'Ed Miliband is a weak leader' drum for the past few weeks, the Guardian in particular.  Just a lazy, late summer copy filling exercise or evidence of a deeper ideological agenda?  Maybe a bit of both.

What does Ed Miliband have to do to prove that he's a 'strong leader'? Unleash a guttural roar during PMQs, tearing his suit in half, beating his chest while he chants out all those who have crossed him and shall be torn to shreds by army of genetically modified party whips?  Much of the media acts like even this wouldn't be enough.

When Cameron is incapable of controlling his Eurosceptic backbenchers does he get called a 'weak leader'? Well, sometimes, by the Telegraph, but not like Miliband does. A little bit of dissent within the Labour party and everyone says that Miliband is a simpering little weakling without the spine for politics. Massive, constant dissent within the Tory party and - what? - what do we hear? Not a peep. Why the double standard?

It's all because Cameron is precisely the kind of smarmy, reptilian leader that we expect from our political class. It's not that he's 'strong' as such; it's that he embodies the political stereotype and anyone who doesn't fit into that narrow little box isn't seen as being leader material.


I'm not a huge Ed Miliband fan but the way he gets treated is infuriating.  It's as though all the media just wants Blair back - although I suppose that'd give tired hacks something to write about.

Conspiracy theories are satanic

The recent network crashes of the Nasdaq stock exchange systems have prompted some to see conspiracies at work; shadowy cabals causing the breakdowns to further their malevolent agendas, and so on.

Scary stuff.  But isn't it scarier to think that nobody is actually in control and everyone is flying blind?  That these crashes really are the result of technical apparatuses that are too complex to be controlled or maintained?

Conspiracy theories are actually reassuring because they suggest that there is some uber-intelligence orchestrating everything - it might be easier to believe in an evil Plan than to face up to telos-less nothingness.

Conspiracy theorists are satanists in the sense that they believe that God exists and that He's evil.

A theo-political atheist must acknowledge that there are conspiracies, cabals and so on in this world but realise, furthermore, that they too are struggling against randomness, contingency and surprise - they just happen to be rather good at it.

Reading Group on Latour's Modes

This blog has been pretty quiet lately.  I've not felt like I've had much to say.  However, I've gotten involved with the reading group for Latour's An Inquiry Into Modes of Existence and just had two pieces I've written posted up there - a summary of the introduction and first chapter and a rather biting critique of Latour's definition of 'the Moderns.'

I won't reproduce the posts here for now but please feel free to take a look at the group and join in if you so wish.  It's being very ably organised by Adam Robbert of the Knowledge Ecology blog.  Adam's contact details are here if you want to join in, or if you just want to read and comment that's fine too.